Cognitive Research in Political Studies

Cognitive Research in Political Studies

A combined model of game theory and cognitive science in the analysis of balancing and hedging policy: A case study of Iran's strategic behavior in a multipolar system

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Malek Ashtar University of Technology
Abstract
International relations in the era of transition to a multipolar order are characterized by increasing uncertainty, great-power competition, and the growing complexity of strategic decision-making processes. Consequently, explaining state behavior solely on the basis of the assumption of perfect rationality is no longer sufficient. This study aims to develop an integrative framework combining game theory, cognitive science, and balance-of-power politics, and seeks to answer the central question: How can the integration of game theory and cognitive components explain and analyze the strategic behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran in its balancing and hedging policies within the multipolar international environment? The research adopts a descriptive-analytical method, utilizing library-based research, theoretical analysis, mathematical modeling, the design of a tripartite strategic game, and simulation of strategic scenarios. Within this framework, a three-layer model is developed, comprising a strategic layer, a cognitive layer, and a geopolitical layer. The interrelationships among these dimensions are analyzed through expanded utility functions and quantitative indicators. The findings indicate that threat perception, the intensity of cognitive biases, and the degree of structural uncertainty play decisive roles in the selection of balancing, hedging, or escalation strategies. In many contexts, these variables exert a greater influence on states' strategic behavior than purely economic factors. Moreover, simulation results suggest that the success of hedging policy depends on the availability of protective options, the reduction of structural uncertainty, and the proper management of threat perception. The novelty of this research lies in offering an analytical-integrative framework that bridges game theory, cognitive science, and balance-of-power politics; developing a cognitive utility function; and presenting a quantitative model for analyzing states' strategic behavior in a multipolar environment—a model that can also be applied to the foreign policy analysis of the Islamic Republic of Iran and other regional powers.
Keywords

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Volume 3, Issue 2 - Serial Number 9
Summer Quarterly
Summer 2026
Pages 162-195

  • Receive Date 09 July 2026
  • Revise Date 30 July 2026
  • Accept Date 12 September 2026